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Abstract
There is much we do not understand about the “location” of innovation: the confluence,
for a particular innovation, of the technology associated with the innovation, the innovating
firm’s size and organizational structure, and the financial contracting that supports the
innovation. This Essay suggests that these three indicia are simultaneously determined and
discusses the interaction among them through four examples of innovative activity whose
location is characterized by tradeoffs between pursuing the activity in an established company;
in a smaller, earlier stage company; or some combination of the two. It first considers the
dilemma faced by an established company in deciding whether to keep an employee’s innovation
or allow the employee to pursue the innovation through a startup. It next takes up a very
different relationship between an established company and an earlier stage company: the
development by the smaller company of a “disruptive” innovation that displaces the industry’s
dominant companies. The Essay then considers an established company’s instrumental use of
the startup market to outsource development of a particular innovation to a technology race.
Finally, the Essay examines a form of innovation located between an established and earlier
stage company: the pattern of joint ventures between large pharmaceutical companies and
smaller biotechnology companies.
___________________

There is much we do not understand about what I will call the “location” of innovation:
the confluence, for a specific innovation, of the technology associated with the innovation; the



Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School; Marc & Eva Professor of Law and
Business, Columbia Law School; and European Corporate Governance Institute. I am grateful to Bengt Holstrom
[Amanda: sometimes in this piece you cite to Bengt Holstrom, and sometimes you cite to Bengt HolMstrom.
They may be two different individuals---a Google search came up with publications by authors under both
spellings---but I wanted to confirm with you], Merritt Fox, Charles Sabel, Armin Schwienbacher. I am also
grateful to participants at the conferences on Business Law and Innovation in New York, Amsterdam, and Tokyo,
and at workshops at Roma Tre, Universita degli Studi, and Cornell Law School for very helpful comments. I am
especially grateful to Peter Conti-Brown for his most helpful research assistance. Stanford Law School, Columbia
Law School, and the Kauffman Foundation provided generous support for this project.
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size and organizational structure of the firm in which the innovation is pursued; and the financial
contracting that supports the innovation. Why do certain technologies match with certain
financial contracts and organizational structures? For example, why are innovative drugs
increasingly developed through joint ventures between capital-heavy large pharmaceutical
companies and smaller but technologically savvy biotech firms, rather than completely within
large pharmaceutical companies? Also, why did so much of Cisco’s 1990s’ development of
networking infrastructure take place through the acquisition and quick integration of hundreds of
startup firms with relevant pre-market technologies, rather than through Cisco itself simply
developing those technologies? The same question arises with respect to the location of any
innovation, including those with the highest public profile: venture capital-backed startups,
which have given rise to companies such as Intel, Apple, and Google.
The gaps in our knowledge are from lack of effort. Few commercial matters have
captured the energy and resources of so many in business, academia, and government. This
attention is unsurprising; after all, innovation represents the source of future economic growth
and, in a global economy, holds the prospect of economic success based on something other than
wage competition. And, indeed, we have much to show for these efforts. For example, there is
now an extensive literature analyzing the financial contracting forms associated with venture
capital and the organizational structure both of venture capital funds and the startups in which
they invest, 1 as well as assessments of the conditions necessary to the success of the venture

1

The literature began with a flurry of groundbreaking studies by Paul Gompers and Joshua Lerner, writing together
and separately. This work is compiled and extended in Paul Gompers & Joshua Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle
(2d ed. 2004). Steven Kaplan and Pers Strömberg extended this work using a different source of contracts. Steven
N. Kaplan & Per[s?] Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev. Econ. Stud. 281 (2003). More recently, Amar Bhide has broadly examined the
effect of globalization on domestic venture capital financing. Amar Bhide, The Venturesome Economy: How
Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a Connected World (2008).
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capital market, 2 and the potential role for the government in creating a venture capital market. 3
This literature is characterized by a vibrant interaction between theory and empirical
investigation, with the particular advantage that investigators have worked directly with actual
transaction documents. 4 Theory is brought to bear on what those individuals and firms engaged
in innovative work actually do and how the organizations that pursue innovation are actually
structured. 5
But venture capital, while certainly important in its own right, is just a drop in the
innovation bucket. In 2006, the four largest U.S. corporate research and development (R&D)
programs alone invested more than five times what the entire U.S. venture capital industry put
into seed, early stage, and startup investments, the areas where the focus on innovation is most
intense. 6 And even large R&D programs do not capture the full picture of the location of
innovation. Indeed, we see research and development carried out in a virtual Cambrian
explosion of organizational forms. In addition to venture capital and the in-house research
efforts of major companies, innovation is at the core of, among others, angel-financed startups
operating earlier in the life cycle than venture capital is available; 7 joint ventures between large

2

See, e.g., Bernard Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus
Stock Markets, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 243 (1998), and the sources cited therein.
3
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55
Stan. L. Rev. 1067 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering Market] and the sources cited therein.
4
See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1; Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 1.
5
See, e.g., Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1; Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 1.
6
In 2006, total U.S. seed, startup, and early stage venture capital investments amounted to some $5.2 billion.
PricewaterhouseCoopers & the Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, The Money Tree Report, available at
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=historical. The combined 2006 R&D spending of
Pfizer, Ford, Johnson & Johnson, and Microsoft was some $30 billion. Barry Jaruzelski & Keving Dehoff, The
Customer Connection: The Global Innovation 1000 (Booze Allen Hamilton 2007), available at http://www.strategybusiness.com/resiliencereport/resilience/rr00053. The attraction of venture capital-based companies is in their
disproportionate success in innovation. Samuel Kortum & Joshua Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture
Capital to Innovation, 31 Rand J. Econ. 674, (2000) (reporting venture capital-backed companies produced close to
three times their proportional amount of patents based on R&D spending).
7
See, e.g., Davan M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1405 (2008);
Brent D. Goldfarb et al., Does Angel Participation Matter? An Analysis of Early Venture Financing (Roger H. Smith
Sch. Research Paper RHS 06=073, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024186.
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companies that combine research efforts in a particular field; 8 joint ventures between large and
small companies, especially prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry; 9 and collaborative
innovation between adjacent parties in the vertical supply chain. 10
While each of these individual examples has been the object of academic attention, they
have by and large been treated separately, as stand-alone silos of innovation rather than as
different solutions to the same overall problem. The features of each location are mapped, but
less attention is paid to why particular types of innovative activity take place in different
locations corresponding to different combinations of technology, the organizational structure in
which the technology is developed, and the financing mode. In this preliminary framing of the
problem, I will suggest that technology, organizational structure, and financing are determined
simultaneously, each dependent on the others. In this sense, in the location of innovation, there
is no independent variable.
My approach to this problem is found at the “T” intersection of (1) Ronald Coase; (2)
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller; and (3) Oliver Williamson and the property rights
literature initiated by Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart, and John Moore. Coase tells us that
frictions determine the organizational location of productive activities: Whether a product will
be produced entirely within a single company or whether elements of it will be acquired by
contract across a market is determined by the transaction costs (particularly the cost of
information) associated with the alternative modes of production. In the absence of frictions, the

8

For example, Pioneer Hi-Bred, a developer of bio-engineered seed stock, and DuPont, a leading producer of plant
pesticides, combined large parts of their research efforts in a joint venture focused on developing seeds that were
resistant to chemical pesticides. DuPont to Invest $1.7 Billion in Pioneer Hi-Bred, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1997, at D3.
9
See, e.g., David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances, 50 J. L. &
Econ. 559 (2007) [hereinafter Robinson & Stuart, Financial Contracting] (describing pharmaceutical joint ventures
between small biotech companies and mature pharmeceutical companies).
10
See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles Sabel, & Robert Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Col. L. Rev. 431 (2009 Even the litany in the text is limited to commercial locations
of innovations; university, and government based research projects are not mentioned.
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organizational form in which an innovative activity is carried out is irrelevant to firm value---all
silos are the same. 11
Modigliani and Miller, 12 reframed in the spirit of Coase, 13 tell us that frictions also
determine a firm’s capital structure---how the assets on the left side of the balance sheet are
financed by the contributions on the right---and the terms of the financial contract associated
with particular capital structure instruments. 14 In the absence of transaction costs, the particular
sources of financing and the financial contract that governs their provision also are irrelevant to
firm value.
Williamson steps behind the no-transaction-costs veil and addresses the types of
transaction costs that shape organizational structure and financial contracting in the real world,
where frictions are pervasive and information is costly and unequally distributed among the
necessary parties. When information differentials are combined with specific investment, the
potential for opportunism---“self-seeking with guile” as Williamson puts it---arises. 15
Grossman, Hart, and Moore build on the contract theory literature to explain firm boundaries (in
their framing, the distribution of asset ownership) as a means to address problems of incomplete

11

Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48
Am. Econ. Rev. [first page of article (1958).
13
Coase was explicit that liability’s location was not irrelevant in a transaction cost free world; his point was that
because the world was so messy, the study of frictions should be at the core of the agenda. The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, (1960). Miller reports having the same point in mind. Writing thirty years after the
irrelevancy propositions were first published, Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporate Finance, and the Theory of the Firm, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958), Miller stated that “[l]ooking back
now, perhaps we should have put more emphasis on the other, upbeat side of the ‘nothing matters’ coin: showing
that what doesn’t matter can also show, by implication, what does.” Merton H. Miller, The Modigliani-Miller
Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J.Econ. Persp. 99, 100 (1988). Of course, that implication drove a significant
research agenda in financial economics over the thirty years following its publication. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom
& Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm in Handbook of Industrial Organization I 62, 79--86 (Richard L.
Schmalansee & Robert Willig, eds. [year])
14
As Miller put it in 1988, capital structure irrelevance was simply “an implication of equilibrium in perfect capital
markets.” Miller, supra note 13, at 99.
15
See, e.g. Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) (defining opportunism)
12
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contracting motivated by information problems, and hence the financial structure that supports
that ownership. 16
As framed by the complementary irrelevancy propositions, the location of innovation--each combination of technology, organizational form, and financial contracting that defines a
characteristic pattern of investment in innovation---reflects a particular combination of
transaction and information costs that tie the organizational form (Coase) and financial
contracting (Modigliani & Miller) to the particular technology. We can explain the variety of
innovative activities across organizational structure and financial contracts, then, as the
interaction of endogenous variables: Technology influences informational asymmetries and
transaction costs, which in turn---theory tells us---influence organizational form. A fully
formulated account should therefore be able to predict which forms of innovation generally will
take place, for example, within startup companies financed by venture capital, within the
research labs of existing large companies, or through cooperation among separate entities. 17
The goal here is to contribute to the understanding of innovative activity distribution
across different types of organizations, in different industries, and using different financial
contracts. My ambition at this initial stage of a very large undertaking is limited. I will consider
a small segment of the three-dimensional locational distribution of innovation. Figure One
illustrates the relationship between each dimension: a particular innovation is developed in a

16

Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Lateral and
Vertical Innovation, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & James Moore, Property Rights and the
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1998). Both the transaction cost and property rights literatures is
surveyed in Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The
Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 629 (2007).
17
Sharon Belenzon et al., Intracompany Governance and Innovation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Review, Working
Paper No. w15304, Aug. 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1463897, make a
similar point, stressing a Coasean perspective in assessing the allocation of research and development between
business groups and conglomerates.
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setting that reflects a particular combination of technology, organizational structure, and
financial contracting.

Each of the four examples I use represents a different set of transaction and information
costs underlying the three determinants of the innovation’s location. Thus, the result is not a
continuum, since each location represents not a linear relationship between two factors, but
something three-dimensional. The information and transaction costs associated with technology,
organization, and finance combine to dictate, for example, the need for and the ability to design
intense incentives, the capacity of managers and investors to monitor the objects of those
incentives with comparable intensity, 18 the level of information costs that influence the parties’
ability to determine their counterparties’ characteristics in financing an innovation, the

18

Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management c.7 (1992) (discussing
correspondence between incentive and monitoring intensity).

7

observability and verifiability of opportunistic behavior, and the array of factors necessary to
support a reputation market that both supplements and supports the explicit contracts between
innovative capital providers and those needing capital. These factors, in turn, determine the
actual location of particular innovative activity.
Here I take up four clusters of innovative activity characterized by tradeoffs between
pursuing an innovation in an established company, a smaller earlier stage company, or some
combination of the two. Part I considers the dilemma faced by an established company in
deciding whether to retain an employee’s innovation or to stand back and allow the employee to
pursue the innovation in a startup company backed by third-party venture capital. In light of the
advantages held by an established company, the question is why we ever see startups in this
situation. Part II then addresses a very different relationship between an established company
and an early stage company: the early stage company’s development of an innovation that
“disrupts” existing industry patterns by devaluing the skills and experience of the industry’s
dominant companies. Here we confront the question of organizational “ambidexterity”: Can the
same organization and financing arrangements successfully support development of the
dominant technology while simultaneously supporting development of the technology that will
supplant the dominant technology and devalue the organization’s expertise associated with it?
Part III takes up an established company’s instrumental use of the startup market; that is, the
decision to outsource the development of particular innovations to a technology race between
startup/early stage companies, with the intention of acquiring the race’s winner. Finally, Part IV
addresses a form of innovation located somewhere between a large and small company: the

8

pattern of joint ventures between large pharmaceutical companies and small, earlier stage
biotechnology firms through which a growing amount of pharmaceutical research takes place. 19
Of course, focusing on these four clusters affecting established and early stage companies
ignores other locations that account for a large proportion of total innovation. Most important, it
ignores the research labs of established companies, where research is financed by cash flow and
the company’s credit, and organized within an existing corporate structure. For now, however,
these four examples, which illustrate the complexity of the locational decision even within the
narrow choice of the host entity size and maturity, are sufficient to demonstrate the value of a
comparative analysis that helps explain how technology, organizational structure, and financial
contracting combine to influence the location of innovation.
I also should note that the interaction between technology, organizational structure, and
financing underlying the innovative activity highlighted here are preliminary, with no small risk
of apophenia. In this respect, it is something of a five-finger exercise, proposing rough
hypotheses for what appear to be regularities among the attributes associated with the locations
of different innovative activity. The taxonomy thus invites both expansion to other regions of
the innovation three-dimensional space, and further analytic and empirical testing of the
hypothesized relationships, which may then falsify some of the hypotheses and refine others.
Nevertheless, I am far more confident that the premise that gives rise to the effort is correct: We
will not understand where innovation takes place---in which organizations and with what kind of
financing---without understanding the endogeneity of the innovative technology, the financial
contracting that feeds it, and the industrial organization that supports it.
Two final introductory matters remain to be considered, the first a qualification and the
second a further justification of the effort. The qualification concerns the static character of the
19

See TAN __ infra. [Amanda: I’m not entirely clear what these citations refer to.]
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analysis, in which fixed clusters of characteristics place innovative activity at fixed locations. Of
course, innovation and its organizational shelter and financing are dynamic, not static;
endogeneity itself implies the prospect of change. Venture capital, for example, is much
different and much more important than it was when American Research and Development, the
first venture capital fund, was conceived immediately following World War II.20 The capital
market has changed, transaction and information costs have changed, and the technologies that
must be financed have changed. Rather than a point in three-dimensional space, perhaps the
better metaphor is the three wheels on a slot machine, one for technology, one for organizational
structure, and one for financing, each turning independently and at different speeds, that coincide
for a time, until the lever is pulled again. Nonetheless, by understanding how the characteristics
interact in their present coincidence, we learn something about how future changes will affect the
organizational outcome.
The last point concerns the normative, rather than the positive payoff to the analysis.
Professionals, often but not limited to lawyers, design organizational form and financial
contracts. I have elsewhere referred to such professionals in general, and business lawyers in
particular, as transaction cost engineers. 21 The original structure of venture capital arrangements
in Silicon Valley---the venture capital limited partnership that defines the arrangement between
investors and venture capital professionals, the range of agreements between the venture capital
fund and the portfolio company, and the fit between the two contractual relationships 22 ---were

20

See David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: The Rise and Demise of American Research
and Development Corporation 1946--73, 14 Indus. & Corp. Change 579 (2005).
21
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239
(1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation].
22
See, e.g., Gilson, Engineering Market, supra note 3 . Gompers & Lerner, supra note 1, provide an extended
analysis of the current research.
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the product of lawyers engineering a structure that accommodated their clients’ needs. 23
Precisely because of the endogeneity of technology, organizational form, and financial
contracting, and the dynamic character of innovation, positive theory helps transaction
professionals structure the arrangements through which innovation takes place. Put differently,
some combination of other people, other entities, and someone else’s money stand between an
innovator’s idea and an innovation reaching the market. Engineering those arrangements is not
the only thing business lawyers do, but it is the most interesting. Understanding the endogeneity
of the location of innovation will help lawyers do it better. 24

I. Why Startups? The Differential Effect of Intense Incentives in Established and Startup
Companies

23

See Mark C. Suchman, The Contracting Universe: Law Firms and the Evolution of Venture Capital
Financing in Silicon Valley (U.S. Nat’l Sci. Found. & Am. Bar Found., ,Working Paper, Jan. 2006),
available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~suchman/drafts/kuniverse.web.pdf (exploring role of lawyers in
developing venture capital structure); Mark C. Suchman & Mia C. Cahill, The Hired Gun Facilitator: The
Case of Lawyers in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 679 (1996) (same).
24
Recently, a number of articles have taken aim at the characterization of a lawyer’s role reflected in the
text. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 Bus. Law. 279 (2009);
Steven L. Schwarz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 486
(2007). Mostly I am flattered that people continue to pay attention to a twenty-five-year-old article in
which the role of the business lawyer as a transaction cost engineer was developed. Gilson, Value
Creation, supra note 21. Nonetheless, the thrust of the criticism warrants comment. First, commentators
point out that transaction lawyers do many kinds of things, and only one, perhaps small, part of their role is
the application of theory, explicit or intuitive, to engineering the organizations and contracts through which
innovation takes place and moves to market. In short, as Professor Dent put it, my approach---what he calls
the “received wisdom”---“is too narrow.” Dent, supra at 281. He has in mind “a fuller vision showing that
business lawyers perform a greater range of activities using a larger set of skills than in the received
model.” Id. Second, the critics point out, as did I, that other professions can do the very same thing. I
agree with both points. Business lawyers do many other things; transaction engineering is merely the most
interesting and challenging. However, I take the broader theme of my now slightly dated claim to be
largely accepted by the commentators, and I would happily substitute the following for the “received
wisdom.” The mark of a professional---how a lawyer creates value---is taking serious theory developed
elsewhere in the university and bringing it to bear on practice of law. Much theory has been developed
since I wrote in 1984. For instance, the notion of teaching law students the tools to create value has given
rise to successful courses in “Deals” at, among others schools, Columbia, Stanford, and the University of
Pennsylvania Law Schools, on some occasions taught jointly in the law school and business school. See
Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School, 2002 Col. Bus. L. Rev. 475,
490--92 (discussing Deals course).
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The classic Silicon Valley story involves an engineer leaving an established company
with no more than an idea and determination, securing venture capital, and becoming fabulously
wealthy either through an Initial Public Offering or a sale of the company. As Willie Nelson
said, in the United States, “our heroes have always been cowboys.” 25 Startup entrepreneurs are
the cowboys of the high tech world. The puzzle, however, is why we ever observe them
Understanding the existence of startups illustrates the endogeneity of financing,
technology, and organizational structure. There is a logic to why innovative technology
conceived of by large-company engineers may become the crown jewels of venture capitalists.
The technology, the organizational structure of the small firm, and the staged financing offered
by venture capitalists are endogenous variables. Each component tells a vital piece of this story.
As a starting point, one might expect that innovation would be located largely within
established firms. Such firms have a number of inherent advantages. External financing of highrisk future growth options is extremely expensive; the information asymmetry between capital
providers and the funded company should make internal financing a far cheaper alternative.26
Moreover, a successful company that knows its customers and its industry should have better
information than a new firm about what industry customers want now and, perhaps more
importantly, what they will want in the future. As a result, their capital budgeting for supporting
innovation should be less error-prone. 27 To the extent research and development will lead to
extensions of existing products or markets, innovation by established companies should benefit
from economies of scale or scope---for example, shared production, distribution and marketing
facilities, as well as the opportunity for shared general overhead expenses---that cannot be
25

See Ronald J. Gilson & Joseph Bankman, Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289, 290 (1999) (analyzing
taxation of startups).
26
See Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J. Fin. 575, 589--90 (1984) (describing how cost
of capital is function of information asymmetries).
27
Part III, infra, takes up a circumstance when the established firm will be at a disadvantage.
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duplicated by a startup. Finally, the U.S. tax code subsidizes research and development by
existing successful companies by allowing losses from failed attempts at innovation to offset
otherwise taxable income from other activities. 28 Since startups have no other income against
which their losses from a particular project may be set off, the government in effect gives
established companies with a stable source of income an R&D tax subsidy that is not available to
a startup entity.
And yet, significant innovation does occur within these seemingly disadvantaged startup
or early stage companies. 29 In this Part, we take up this puzzle by assessing the relative
advantages and disadvantages of mature and startups companies. The conclusion is that mature
employer companies rationally choose to let some employees with valuable innovations leave for
startups..
A. Why Startups? 30
To see why any innovation takes place within startups, it is helpful to characterize the
venture capital process as an auction: The employee innovator offers to sell an ownership
interest in the intellectual property represented by her innovation. 31 While venture capital firms
can participate in the auction, so too can the employer. And on a first cut, the employer should
always win because the opportunity should be worth more to the employer, for the reasons
discussed below.

28

See Gilson & Bankman, supra note 25, (reviewing tax treatment of startups).
Kortum & Lerner, supra note 4, show that such companies, based on research and development spending,
produced almost three times their proportional amount of patents.
30
This section draws on Gilson & Bankman, supra note 25.
31
This formulation assumes that the engineer, rather than the employer, has the property rights in the idea,
despite the fact that the innovation was typically conceived while the engineer was an employee. For a
discussion of the engineer’s property rights, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 575 (1999).
29

13

The employer’s first advantage is a more favorable tax treatment. As stated above, in the
United States an investment made by an established company that has past income and can
expect future income is subject to symmetric tax treatment: Gains are taxed, and losses offset
other income from tax. Since innovation is risky, the ability to reduce taxes by the amount of
losses from unsuccessful efforts is significant. In contrast, the startup’s future tax treatment is
asymmetric: While gains are taxed, losses provide no tax benefit because the failed startup has
no past income and will have no future income. 32
The employer also has a range of informational advantages. If the innovation has some
relation to the employer’s business, a not unreasonable assumption given the innovation’s
development during the employee’s job tenure, the employer should have better information than
a venture capital firm about the innovator’s talents, the innovation itself, and the potential
market. Writ large, the argument reflects the pecking order theory of capital structure: 33 The
spread between the costs of internal and external capital will increase as the information
asymmetry between the company and providers of outside capital (like the venture capitalists)
increases.
Finally, as previously noted, the employer’s informational advantage shades into scope
and scale economies. To the extent that the innovation is complimentary to the employer’s
business, commercialization of the innovation can benefit from shared customers, distribution
channels and marketing, and perhaps some elements of manufacturing.
So why do startups ever occur? Under these circumstances, something about the
transaction and information costs of both the established employer and the venture capitalbacked startup’s organizational structure must result in efficiency advantages for the startup form
32
33

The tax analysis is set out in more detail in Gilson & Bankman, supra note 25, at 293--95.
See Myers, supra note 26 .
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that offsets the employers’ tax, informational, scale, and scope advantages. There are two
categories of explanations for the presence of startup ventures: problems that the employer has
in actually taking advantage of the innovation, and advantages of the venture capital-backed
startup form. In the case of startups, the technology favors locating the innovation in the
employer; however, that advantage is trumped by the transaction and information cost
differences between a large established employer and a single project startup.
B. Problems with Employer Implementation
The literature identifies a range of problems with employer implementation of the
employee’s innovation that would not burden a startup, and so would reduce the employer’s bid
in our metaphorical auction relative to that of a venture capitalist. A number of scholars have
focused on the risk to the employee of merely disclosing the innovation; by doing so, the
employee will compromise his intellectual property. The danger that the employer will
misappropriate the innovation if it is disclosed in order to “bid” against the venture capitalist
may cause the employee to favor a startup even if the innovation would be worth more if
implemented by the employer. 34 Presumably, the venture capitalist does not present a
misappropriation risk.
Two elements arguably reduce the potential that the venture capitalist will misappropriate
an innovation disclosed in a submitted business plan (although neither explanation is wholly
satisfactory). The first, and less significant, is that because the venture capitalist is not an
operating company, it has less reason than the employer to misappropriate the innovation: The
34
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employer can use the innovation in its own business, while the venture capitalist cannot. This
analysis ignores, however, the fact that the particular startup will not be the venture capitalist’s
only investment. Even though the venture capitalist cannot itself use the employee’s innovation,
it will have ongoing investments in other startups, to which the employee’s innovation might be
valuable. The temptation to profit from misappropriated innovation by giving it to another
portfolio company in which, because of multiple financing rounds, the venture capitalist has a
much larger investment, provides the venture capitalist a motive for misappropriation, especially
if the venture capitalist has a specialized portfolio that overlaps with the innovator’s technology.
The second and more persuasive protection against venture capitalists misappropriating
an employee’s innovation is that venture capitalists operate in a reputation market. Venture
capital markets are local, and rich information about venture capitalists’ conduct spreads very
quickly. 35 As a result, misappropriating an innovation in the course of its evaluation would be
punished in the venture capital market. 36 But while more plausible, this explanation exaggerates
the difference in position between the employer and the venture capitalist. Employers also are
constrained by a reputation market, albeit an internal one.
Although it is not misleading to frame the employee’s decision to pursue her innovation
through a startup as an auction, it also is important to realize the limits of the metaphor. The
employer actually bids for a portion of the employee’s innovation not ex post through a venture
capital-like bid when the innovating employee has decided to leave, but ex ante through the
incentive compensation structure of the company. For example, the employer’s compensation
structure may contemplate that an innovative employee receive an equity participation in an
employer subsidiary---“intrapreneurship”---if she has a great idea. She may also receive a large
35
36
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bonus. The employer misappropriates the innovation by not making the anticipated payoff. But
the employer, just like the venture capitalist, is a repeat player in an information rich context, and
the conditions necessary for an internal reputation market concerning the treatment of employee
innovations will also operate to constrain misappropriation. 37 Thus, the argued difference
between an employer company’s incentives to misappropriate versus those of a venture capitalist
is overstated.
The more persuasive barriers to the employer retaining an employee’s innovation come
when the costs of internal conflicts outweigh the benefits of the innovation’s retention. Thomas
Hellmann has argued that employees whose positions would be threatened by the innovation
may act to undermine its further development. 38 In a related vein, Paul Milgrom and John
Roberts note that there are opportunity costs when employees divert their efforts from productive
activities to efforts to protect their positions by trying to influence company decisionmakers
against the innovation. 39 If these opportunity costs are sufficiently high, the employer will prefer
to push the “threatening” innovation out the door and into the hands of waiting venture
capitalists.
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Finally, Bankman and Gilson highlight the measurement problems that flow from giving
employees a powerful incentive to develop the innovation. 40 In order for an internal incentive to
reward innovative employees, the employer must identify, after the fact, the employees to whom
an innovation belongs. The need to identify ownership of an innovation may have significant
costs. To see the problem, assume that research and development is most efficiently carried out
in teams. Further assume that the research process has economies of scope---there is a benefit
from continuously sharing research among teams---and that the more ongoing research is shared,
the more difficult it is for any single individual or team to establish property rights in a single
invention. Under these circumstances, employees have a powerful incentive to perfect their
property rights by hoarding research results, a strategy that will be costly to the employer for at
least two reasons. First, any time spent on concealment reduces the time the employee spends on
productive activities. Second, and more important, this concealment restricts economies of
scope by reducing other employees’ productivity, since their performance would have been
better had information been shared rather than hoarded.
So what is an employer to do? Both the benefits and costs of the employer’s bid---its
internal incentive system that rewards innovative employees---increase the intensity of the
incentive. The higher the incentive, the more employees who will turn the innovation over to the
employer rather than found a startup. But the higher the incentive, the more employees are
motivated to hoard research to protect their property rights, and the larger the cost the employer’s
bidding imposes on its overall R&D effort. In equilibrium, the employer will set the intensity of
the incentive at the point where the costs to the entire research effort associated with the increase
in incentives necessary to keep one additional employee are higher than the expected value from
one retained innovation. At the margin, some innovative employees leave for startups, while
40
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others remain in-house. This outcome is consistent with observed experience: Established
technology companies both do substantial amounts of research and lose employees to startups. 41
The outcome also is consistent with another observation concerning the distribution of
innovation between established companies and startups. One would expect that established
companies are best suited to incremental innovation, while startups do better at discontinuous
innovation. This is due in part to the lower payoffs to, and, consequently, more limited external
financial market for, incremental innovation. Thus, established companies need to offer less
intense internal incentives to retain incrementally innovative employees. But it is also due to the
reduction in the influence costs, identified by Milgrom and Roberts, 42 and a corresponding
reduction in the innovation hoarding that results from the need to perfect property rights in the
innovation.
Masahiko Aoki makes this point in an interesting way. 43 Aoki stresses that the genius of
Japanese manufacturing is the enormous emphasis on teamwork and information sharing both
horizontally and vertically. Such sharing is the opposite of employee property rights perfection
associated with the intense incentives necessary to retain the innovations that otherwise would
migrate to venture-backed startups. The Japanese result---counter-intuitive by American
standards---is supported by low intensity incentives: A commitment to lifetime employment and
lock step compensation. Aoki argues that these low-intensity incentives encourage employees to
invest in firm specific human capital and not to hoard information at the expense of other teams
and the firm’s capacity to receive and use new information. Aoki also notes, however, that these
41
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attributes makes the Japanese system very effective when innovation is incremental, as in
process innovation, and not very effective when innovation is discontinuous and powerful
incentives matter much more. 44 Thus, the balance is sensitive not only to organizational
structure and incentives, but also to the character of the technology associated with an
innovation. As argued above, organizational structure and technology are simultaneously
determined. In Japan, the organizational structure of flat hierarchies and the “technology” of
process innovation illustrate the endogeneity hypothesis described above. The nature of
structural incentives in established companies and venture-backed startups do the same. 45
C. Advantages of Startups 46
So far we have focused on the factors that influence the size of the employer’s bid to
retain an employee with an innovative technology. We turn now to the determinants of the
venture capitalist’s bid. What are the value consequences of developing the innovation within a
venture capital-backed startup?
Here we benefit from a large literature that addresses the financial contract between a
venture capital firm and a portfolio company, 47 and the fit between that contract and the financial
contract between the venture capital fund and its investors. All financial contracts respond to
three central problems: uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs. In early stage
technology financing, these three problems are presented in extreme form. The early stage of the
44
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venture magnifies uncertainty; almost all important decisions concerning the company remain to
be made, and all of its value depends on uncertain future growth. That uncertainty expands the
information asymmetries between the investor and the entrepreneur: As the entrepreneur’s
intentions and abilities are less observable than actions already taken and the actual operation of
a business, neither of which is available for many entrepreneurs seeking venture financing. And
because the entrepreneur’s interest in a startup funded by venture capital is fairly characterized as
an option, in some circumstances there will be significant agency costs: The entrepreneur’s
interests and those of the capital provider will sharply diverge, especially with respect to postfinancing decisions concerning the duration and riskiness of the venture.
The organizational and contractual structure of the U.S. venture capital market responds
directly to this trio of problems. That response also influences the difference between an
innovation’s value if developed within a venture capital-backed startup or developed within an
established company. For our purposes, one characteristic of this response is critical: Very
high-power incentives for all participants---investors in venture capital funds, general partners of
the funds, and entrepreneurs---are coupled with very intense monitoring of entrepreneurs by
venture capitalists, and monitoring of venture capitalists by the capital market. 48
Consider first the incentives for the entrepreneur---our engineer leaving her employer
with an innovation in mind. The first element of the entrepreneur’s incentive structure comes
from the fact that the initial venture capital investment typically will be insufficient to fund the
startup company’s entire business plan. The investment will instead be “staged.” A particular
investment round will provide only the capital the business plan projects as necessary to achieve
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specified milestones set out in the business plan. 49 While first round investors expect to
participate in subsequent investment rounds, 50 typically they are not contractually obligated to do
so even if the business plan’s milestones are met; the terms of later rounds of investment are
negotiated at the time the milestones are met, and the prior investment exhausted. The result is
to give the venture capitalist the power to decide whether the project (and the startup company)
goes forward. This structure both gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive to perform and
gives the venture capitalist the means to monitor that performance.
The powerful incentive provided by staged financing also reduces the information
asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur concerning the entrepreneur’s
talents. Every incentive has an information related flipside that responds to adverse selection
problems. In deciding which startups to finance, the venture capital fund has to distinguish
between good and bad entrepreneurs under circumstances in which an entrepreneur has better
information about her own skills than does the investor. Because the incentive created by staged
financing is more valuable to a good entrepreneur than a bad one, an entrepreneur’s willingness
to accept an intense incentive is a signal of the entrepreneur’s difficult-to-observe skills. The
signal is particularly important for early stage and high technology portfolio companies because
the absence of a performance history and the technical nature of the projects make the
entrepreneur’s skills particularly difficult to observe. 51 In comparison, the entrepreneur’s
employer will have had substantial opportunity to observe her performance. To some extent, the
49
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screening function of the venture capital incentive structure overcomes some of the employer’s
informational advantage.
The entrepreneur next faces the portfolio company’s compensation system. Perhaps
more starkly than with any other organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio
company’s compensation structure creates extremely high powered performance incentives that
serve to align the incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture capital fund.
In essence, the overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation is dependent on the
portfolio company’s success. Low salaries are offset by the potential for a large increase in the
value of the entrepreneur’s stock ownership, and by the award of stock options to other
management members. The performance incentive is further heightened by requiring the
entrepreneur and other members of management to accept a staged vesting requirement on some
or all of their stock or stock options. 52 The vesting requirement gives the portfolio company the
right to purchase a portion of the entrepreneur’s or other management’s stock, at a favorable
price, if employment terminates prior to a series of specified dates. It also restricts exercise of
options until after the manager has worked at the firm for a specified number of years, following
which an additional number of options become both exercisable and no longer subject to
forfeiture if employment terminates. 53
While aligning the interests of the venture capital fund and entrepreneur in some
circumstances, the intensity of these incentives can also lead to agency costs in others. In
particular, the option-like characteristics of the portfolio company’s compensation structure can
lead the entrepreneur to increase the risk associated with the portfolio company’s future returns,
52
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because the venture capital fund will bear a disproportionate share of the increased downside but
share only proportionately in the upside. Thus, the intensity of the performance incentives
created by the compensation structure requires the venture capital fund to monitor the portfolio
company’s performance.
The entrepreneur’s high-powered incentives to perform are matched by the venture
capital fund general partner’s incentives to monitor. The bulk of the general partner (GP)’s
compensation comes in the form of a carried interest---20% of the venture capital fund’s ultimate
profits is a common figure---distributed to the GP when realized profits are distributed to the
investor limited partners. In effect, the GP receives an option on 20% of the gain in the portfolio
company’s value. Given the high variance associated with startup company performance, that
option will be very valuable. Most important, by monitoring the entrepreneur, the GP can
influence the outcome of the events on which he has an option. Thus, the structure of the general
partner’s incentives provides an intense incentive to monitor, which balances the entrepreneur’s
intense incentive to perform. 54
The term structure of the venture capital limited partnership also gives general partners
an incentive to monitor the entrepreneur’s performance. The partnership typically has a fixed
term, usually ten years, after which the fund’s assets are distributed to the investors. The result is
that at predictable intervals, the investor can assess the general partner’s performance when
deciding whether to reinvest the funds distributed with the general partner. The success of
portfolio companies is the most visible indicia of the general partner’s performance. 55
D. Assessment
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The employer of an innovative employee on the one hand, and a venture capital fund on
the other hand, have different capabilities and therefore different assessments of the value of the
employee’s. We have seen that the employer bids by means of its internal incentive structure. 56
But this structure is not monotonic; at some point increasing the internal incentives another notch
in order to retain an additional engineer and her innovation results in costs across the rest of the
employer’s R&D effort that are greater than the innovation’s value. At that point, overall firm
performance decreases as the intensity of incentives increases. And there is reason to speculate
that in many companies, the inflection point may come at very low levels of incentive intensity
because the cost of too high incentives will be spread over the company’s entire R&D effort,
while the benefit will be limited to retaining discrete innovations. This likely explains the
infrequent use of intrapreneurship strategies, an arrangement by which an employer locates an
employee’s innovation in a newly created subsidiary and, by giving the employee an ownership
interest in the subsidiary, effectively matches the intensity of the incentive that the employee
would confront through the venture-capital financial contract.
In contrast, in venture capital-backed startups, where the general partner’s intense
incentives to monitor matches the entrepreneur’s intense incentives to perform, and where the
startup company typically has a single project on whose success the incentives are based, there is
no need for property right perfection. As a result, there are none of the barriers to spillovers to
other projects that plague the use of intense incentives in established companies. For the startup,
overall performance is increasing in the intensity of incentives.
In the end, this analysis leads one to expect specialization in the location of innovation of
the sort we observe anecdotally. As Aoki concluded with respect to Japanese manufacturing,
incremental innovation, such as process improvements in manufacturing that depend on
56
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teamwork and information sharing, responds to more gentle incentives, like stable employment
and predictable compensation. 57 In contrast, intense incentives matched by intense monitoring
fit better with single project efforts, especially in fast-moving technology markets where first
mover advantage may mean that the race for the next generation of technology has only one
winner. While more detailed study is warranted, this allocation of innovative activity illustrates
the need to understand how the intersection of an innovation’s technology, organizational
structure, and financing directs the project’s location.
II. Disruptive Innovation
In an influential book, Clayton Christensen describes a quite different interaction between
established companies and early stage companies with respect to the location of innovation. 58
Christensen focuses on why established industry leaders fail to anticipate an innovation that
devalues their skills and products, and as a result dilutes their dominant position. In
Christensen’s term, such an innovation is a “disruptive” technology. The problem is not that the
industry leaders are bad managers. Indeed, these companies are extremely well managed, in that
they are attentive to their customers’ needs, continuously improve the quality and reduce the
prices of their products, and usually anticipate what their customers will want before the
customers know it themselves. 59
Instead, the problem arises precisely because the industry leaders are so good at what
they do. Rather than simply extending the existing method of production, a disruptive
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technology reflects so sharp a break with existing products that neither a leading producer nor its
sophisticated customers initially see the technology’s potential. And because the market for the
disruptive technology is initially so small, a rational manufacturer would ignore the innovation,
sensibly concluding that the returns on an investment would not be worth the effort. As a result,
a disruptive technology takes root in secondary markets of no interest to the industry leaders.
Later, developments in the disruptive technology allow it to be generalized to the industry core;
dominant firms are then displaced because they cannot respond quickly enough to the change in
the architecture of production. 60
In Part I we considered one circumstance in which established firms chose to allow an
innovation to go to a startup---the employer sets its internal incentives at a level such that some
number of employees pursue their innovations through a startup. There, however, the problem
was not that the employer did not appreciate the value of the innovation. Rather, the employer
recognized that the incentive intensity necessary to assure that all employee-inspired innovations
remained with the company would reduce the overall efficiency of its existing R&D capacity by
more than the value of retaining the innovation. Such firms made a clear-eyed calculation that
allowed some of their employees to seek financing through a venture capital firm. In the case of
a disruptive technology, an established firm’s decision not to pursue the disruptive technology is
also rational, but only because the innovation’s value is not visible when the decision is made.
Put differently, a dominant company passes on many innovations because it concludes, based on
its experience, that they are not valuable. Sometimes the dominant company turns out to be very
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wrong. A related phenomenon involves companies that recognize that a competing technology
has potential; they try to straddle the two technologies, but fail at the task of simultaneously
pursuing the existing technology while embracing the new. 61
Christensen’s solution for an established company is interesting in that it realizes that for
some types of innovation, organizational form is critical. In effect, Christensen recommends that
the established company hedge the potential that a technology is disruptive by creating a separate
unit that is matched to the smaller market available to the technology at that time, at a sufficient
distance that the incentive problems discussed in Part I are minimized. 62 If the technology
ultimately proves disruptive, the established company has the resources to grow the small
separate unit quickly.
Other management scholars are more optimistic. Although recognizing the problem
Christensen poses, they envision an “ambidextrous” firm that “can compete simultaneously in
both mature and emerging markets” without the resigned separation Christensen recommends. 63
But regardless of whether firms can be taught to be switch hitters, 64 at this point we are back to
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the problem confronted in Part I: how does an established company manage the general problem
of keeping innovations without destabilizing the internal incentives for the rest of its business?
Christensen does not specifically address this issue, but the fact that his recommendation
highlights it provides support for the effort undertaken here. The location of innovation within
an alternative firm or within an ambidextrous firm whose internal organization is radically
refigured is endogenous, reflecting the particular confluence of transaction costs, financial
contracting techniques, and the substance of the technology. Christensen identifies another
instance where the location of the technology and the corresponding financing of its
development is outside the universe of established firms. Again, we see the centrality of the
confluence of technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting to the tradeoff
between established firms and early stage startup firms.
III. An Established Company Using a Technology Race Among Startups: The Cisco
Systems’ Strategy in the 1990s
We now consider a third intersection between an established company and a startup firm,
which may provide an established company a different way to avoid Christensen’s innovator’s
dilemma. During the 1990s, Cisco Systems confronted a difficult problem. Cisco specialized in
the hardware and software that supported local and wide area networks. 65 The company was
extremely successful, having grown in fourteen years from a startup to a point where 65% of
LAN networks used Cisco routers. However, network technology grew in power very quickly
senior vice president for technology then succeeded this individual. In turn, the individuals chosen to lead
a particular new business initiative are not younger managers, but according to IBM “are very experienced
people, who have built big businesses.” Id. For example, the individual chosen to run anew business had
previously run IBM’s Unix business that had $4 billion in sales.
While this approach may work for IBM, one would be skeptical of whether it can generalize to other
companies, few of whom will have the management depth to move the head of major businesses to a
startup business. Successfully ambidextrous companies, and switch hitters like Mickey Mantle, may not
come along very often.
65
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and changed just as quickly---a product lifecycle was estimated to be eighteen months and it was
expected that new solutions would double performance at the same price. 66 At any given point,
it was hard to predict the path the technology would take; while the problems that would need to
be solved were visible, a variety of technological solutions might be possible. And because
markets for network hardware often rewarded the winner of the technology race with significant
first mover advantages, being quick was the best way to avoid being dead. But any single
company has limited internal R&D capacity; it can do some things well and not others, and it can
only do so much. 67 The limited visibility of the direction of the market and the short product
lead time---said to be six months from when the company knew it needed to bring a product to
market---meant that Cisco did not have the time needed to develop all required innovation
internally. And the further away an innovation was from Cisco’s core technology, the greater the
risk that the company would lack the organizational capacity to develop it. Making the wrong
bet on the solution in the face of significant first mover advantages could be far more costly than
the company was willing to bear.
Startup and growing early stage companies provided a way for Cisco to deal with the
need for expertise that it might not already have in-house. The lack of visibility of the direction
of technology reflected the fact that different solutions were possible to most problems. This is
where early stage and startup companies provided an opportunity. If venture capitalists funded
startups that pursued alternative solutions to the technology problem, then Cisco could acquire
the company that won the technology race in time to have a product to market when it was
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needed. 68 To be sure, the price for the winner would be high---competitors might bid, and an
initial public offering could provide the winner’s venture capitalists an alternative liquidity
event. Cisco’s large market share and its extensive marketing and distribution system, however,
gave it advantages that the focused winner of the technology race could not match on a standalone basis. 69 For the same reasons, Cisco could be expected to pay more to exercise the real
option that its strategy entailed: to wait and see which technology was best and then acquire it.
For present purposes, the interesting point of the Cisco example is that it frames a
different question concerning the efficient location of innovation as between a startup and an
established company. In Part I, innovation was allocated between an established company and a
startup based on the differential operation of intense incentives in the two environments. Here
innovation is allocated based on technological imperative---the ability of the venture capital
market to finance a range of alternative solutions to a technology problem and make use of the
incentive intensity of a startup structure, neither of which Cisco could match internally.
Consistent with this confluence of technology, organizational structure, and financial
contracting, Cisco developed the ability to quickly and effectively integrate new acquisitions. 70
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John Chambers, Cisco’s CEO then and now, described the process in this fashion: “Our ideal acquisition
is a small startup that has a great technology product on the drawing board that is going to come out 6 to 12
months from now. When we do that, we are buying the engineers and the next-generation product. Then
we blow the product through our distribution channels and leverage our manufacturing and financial
strengths.” Henry Goldblatt, Cisco’s Secrets, Fortune, Nov. 8, 1999; see Stan. Graduate Sch. of Bus.,
Nicole Tempest, Cisco Systems, Inc.: Acquisition Integration for Manufacturing 5, Case OIT-26 (2/3/04),
available at http://gsbapps.stanford.edu/cases/documents/OIT26.pdf (“Cisco viewed acquisitions as a
means to ensure that it was offering the ‘best of the breed’ product technology.”).
69
John Chambers described Cisco’s first acquisition in 1993 of Crescendo as follows: “We took
Crescendo’s networking product, and within 18 months we had a $500 million run rate. No small company
can go from $10 million to $500 million in 18 months. They just can’t scale. But we could scale because
of our distribution, financial, and manufacturing strengths.” Gerry Yemen et al., Cisco: Early if Not
Elegant (A) 8 (Univ. of Va. Case Study UVA-BP-0446, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=907938
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This strategy put enormous pressure on Cisco to quickly integrate the companies it acquired into the
Cisco structure, including especially the Cisco incentive system. This point is stressed in O’Reilly,
Acquisition of Technology, supra note 65; Tempest, supra note 68; Yemen et al., supra note 69.
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In effect, Cisco outsourced R&D to market-based technology races between startups to achieve
the basic innovation, but took on the task itself of commercializing the innovation.
IV. Joint Ventures Between Large Pharmaceutical Companies and Biotechnology
Companies
In this Part we consider the pattern of joint ventures between small biotech companies
and large pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs. 71 As in the Cisco case, this final
example allocates innovation to a small company and commercialization to an established
company. It differs in that the Cisco strategy contemplated sequential cooperation, the
acquisition occurring only after the technology is developed, with the incentive structure driving
that development supplied by the early stage company and the market. The large pharma/biotech
joint ventures, however, contemplate a cooperative arrangement from the beginning, meaning an
organizational structure must be developed to govern that cooperation.
Two important background facts put the large pharma/small biotech joint ventures in
context. These concern the costs and risks associated with developing a new drug and the very
large change in technology that gave rise to the new generation of biotech firms. Consider first
the costs and risks associated with new drug development. 72 The initial screening of potential
drug candidates and the work that precedes the commencement of clinical trials takes some three
to six years. During that period, the number of compounds examined runs from 5,000--10,000,
which ultimately yield a small number that warrant scientific and animal testing. An application
for an Investigational New Drug is then filed with the FDA. If approved, clinical testing on
humans can begin, which takes another six to seven years. That period is broken down into three
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See, e.g., Robinson & Stuart, Financial Contracting, supra note 9 (describing pharmaceutical joint
ventures between small biotech companies and mature pharmaceutical companies).
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This account of the approval process draws on Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 10, at 468, and Patricia
Danzon et al., Productivity in Pharmaceutical-biotechnology R&D: The Role of Experience and Alliances,
24 J. Health Econ. 317, 318 (2005).
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test phases, the first involving fewer than 100 persons, the second between 100 and 500, and the
third between 1,000 and 5,000. If the drug passes these tests, the sponsoring company files a
New Drug Application (NDA). FDA review of the NDA can take another six months to two
years. If the FDA approves, the drug can be brought to market. Out of 5,000 to 10,000
compounds that are initially screened, it is estimated that only 250 begin preclinical testing, 73
and the FDA ultimately approves only about 20% of drugs that begin human testing. After
receiving this approval, the drug’s commercial success can finally be determined. 74
The expense of the process is consistent with its length. The average cost of drug
development, from initial research and development through FDA approval, but excluding
commercialization costs, was estimated in 2003 at $802 million, using even earlier data. 75
Taking into account the time value of money, the scientific risk associated with securing
approval, and the commercial risk that even approved drugs will not have sufficient sales to
provide a return on investment, new drug development presents a daunting challenge.
The second background fact that puts large pharma/small biotech firm alliances in
context is the dramatic change in the underlying science that gave rise to them. By the early
1980s, it became apparent that advances in biotechnology required large pharmaceutical
companies to develop skills quite different than the chemistry-based science that had previously
driven pharmaceutical research. 76 Those skills were found in small, early stage firms, typically

73. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nat’l Inst. of Health, A Plan to Ensure Taxpayers’ Interests Are
Protected (2001), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm.
74. Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Evidence of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
Health Econ. 151, 165 (2003).
75
Id.
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See, e.g., Sean Nicholson et al., Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Sign of Assets and Firm Quality,
78 J. Bus. 1433, 1434 (2005) (“[B]iotech firms pioneered new drug discovery technologies . . . , whereas
traditional pharmaceutical companies have superior expertise in chemistry. . . .”); W. Powell, InterOrganizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. Inst. & Theo. Econ. 197, 202 (1996)
[hereinafter Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration] (“But Biotech proved to be, in Schumperterian
terms, a competence-destroying innovation because it built on a new science base (molecular biology and
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formed by university-affiliated scientists. 77 Forming alliances with these smaller, research
oriented companies provided quicker access to this knowledge than the pharmas developing the
capabilities in-house 78 and, in turn, took advantage of the pharmas’ experience and capabilities at
conducting human testing and running the FDA licensing gauntlet. 79
The large pharma/small biotechnology joint ventures nicely illustrate how the intersection
of technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting dictate the location of
innovation. As we have already seen, the development of new drugs based on biotechnology
required a combination of skills---biotechnology on the one hand and commercialization and
FDA experience on the other---that could not be found in either mature pharmaceutical
companies or in the early state biotechnology firms. While the new biotechnology was
potentially “disruptive” in the Christensen sense discussed in Part II, it lacked the characteristic
that drives Christensen’s account of the displacement of industry leaders by the unexpected
success of what initially appeared as peripheral technologies. The potential of biotechnology
was plainly evident, so that the large pharmaceutical companies did not ignore this avenue of
research. Rather, the question was how to secure it.
Here the Christensen analysis is relevant. At least at the outset, the pharmaceutical
companies did not believe they could be ambidextrous. The characteristics of biotechnology
immunology) that differed significantly from the knowledge base (organic chemistry and its clinical
applications) of the mature pharmaceutical industry.”); Nadine Roijakkers & John Hagedoorn, Inter-firm
R&D Partnering in Pharmaceutical Biotechnology Since 1975: Trends, Patterns, and Networks, 35 Res.
Pol’y 431, 444 (2006) (growth in alliances “primarily caused by the need of large pharmaceutical
companies to access a recent explosion in biotechnological knowledge”); see also Louis Galombos & J.
Stuchio, Pharmaceutical Firms and The Transition to Biotechnology, 72 Bus. Hist. Rev. 250 (1998).
77
See Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note 76, at 199--201 (describing distribution of
expertise); Walter W. Powell et al., Organizational and Institutional Genesis: The Emergence of High-Tech
Clusters in the Life Sciences, in The Emergence of Organization and Markets c. 14 (J. Padgett & W.
Powell eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter Powell, Institutional Gensis] (same).
78
See, e.g., Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note 76, at 203 (describing expertise in small
biotech companies).
79
See, e.g., Nicholson et al., supra note 76, at 1434 (large pharmaceutical capabilities with FDA process as
a cause of alliances).
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research more closely resembled university-based research than how research was organized
within the large pharmaceutical firms. 80 Whether the two research styles, including scientists
who both moved between universities and industry and often straddled the two, could be housed
in the same organization was thought problematic. 81 In this respect, the analysis tracks our
earlier analysis of the different incentive structures of established and startup companies. 82
Consistent with this concern, when the Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche acquired
56% of Genentech, the iconic biotech company co-founded by academics Herbert Boyer and
Paul Berg, both committed not to buy the rest of the company without a majority vote of the
minority shareholders, and left Genentech’s headquarters and operations in the San Francisco
Bay Area rather than integrating the biotechnology company with its other operations. When
Roche bid to acquire the remainder of the shares in 2008 over Genentech’s objection, concerns
about the impact of the acquisition on Genentech “culture” were widespread, and Roche again
committed to leave Genentech in San Francisco, rather than integrating to the end of retaining
Genentech’s culture. 83
The same kinds of concerns also may have counseled against a Cisco-like strategy.
Recall that Cisco’s strategy was to rely on the market to motivate a technology race, but once
having bought the winner, to quickly and fully integrate the acquired company, including
replacing the acquired company’s incentive system with that of Cisco. 84 In the case of
biotechnology, especially in the early years, the culture gap, including differences in the
80
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Powell et al, Institutional Genesis, supra note 77, report an extreme example of the concern. In 1986, Eli Lilly, a
large Midwestern pharmaceutical firm, acquired Hybritech, a San Diego based early stage biotech company, for
$300 million. The outcome of the acquisition was described as follows: “Within one year, no Hybritech employees
remained with Lilly, but more than 40 San Diego biotech firms were subsequently formed by former Hybritech
employees. A senior female scientist quipped that the merger ‘was like Animal House meets the Waltons.’” Id.
(citations omitted).
82
See TAN_43--49 supra.
83
See, e.g., Andrew Jack, Roche Launches Hostile Bid for Genentech, Financial Times, Jan. 30, 2009.
84
See Stanford, supra note 9 (describing Cisco’s integration strategy
81

35

incentive structure of biotechnology and large pharmaceutical companies, was too large for the
Cisco acquisition and integrate strategy. 85
If the technology differences between the biotechnology and large pharmaceutical
companies made acquisitions generally unattractive, then the combination of the capabilities of
the two types of companies would have to be done outside either of the existing entities. This
means that the organization of the joint venture would be contractual. And here the problem of
crafting the contract was daunting. As Gilson, Sabel, and Scott put it: “The inability of the
parties to specify ex ante the nature of the product to be produced or its performance
characteristics means that the terms of production will be determined by the very governance
process the contract creates.” 86 The result is a structure that contemplates collaboration through
a joint committee that shapes the research agenda and resolves disputes, but without specifying
legally enforceable provisions that delineate the parties’ actual conduct or the course of the
research.
That pattern shifts once the research effort identifies a drug candidate and uncertainty is
reduced. Instead of contractual provisions that are directed at process rather than outcome, we
then observe explicit allocation of property rights in the compound through a set of nested
options: The pharma has the option to go forward with clinical testing at its expense and the
biotech firm receives a royalty right if the tests are successful, with the biotechnology company
regaining the technology if the pharma does not go forward. Thus, we observe a braiding of
implicit contracts supported by an explicit governance arrangement that allow the parties to learn
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about each other’s capabilities and capacity for cooperation and then carry out the research
design that is developed through that cooperation, and explicit contracts that allocate property
rights through options on the technology once a drug candidate is identified. 87 In turn, the same
governance provisions facilitate both parties developing reputations for the capacity to
successfully collaborate in these relationships, which facilitate their entering into similar
arrangements with other companies. 88
Finally, the financial contracting arrangements observed in large pharma/small
biotechnology company joint ventures reflect the simultaneous determination of organizational
structure and financial contracting in light of the technology involved. Lerner and Merges
suggest that, during the 1990s, more funding was provided to biotechnology companies through
joint ventures and strategic alliances than from venture capital, initial public offerings, or
secondary offerings of stock. 89 This allocation is hardly surprising. Equity financing through
venture capital provides a sensible form of financial contracting for early stage biotech
companies while research efforts identify drug candidates during periods when compounds are
being identified, and uncertainty makes it difficult to base payment to the biotech company
largely on performance, and when the biotech company needs assurance that the large pharma
company will have the proper incentives when they decide whether to incur the large costs
associated with pursuing FDA approval. In turn, the FDA approval process, including especially
human testing, involves a level of costs and takes a length of time that are inconsistent with the
87
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venture capital funding structure. Recall that the investment required for a single compound to
get through the process was on average $800 million based on pre-2003 data, an amount too
large for venture capital funds to provide, and that the process takes some twelve years, too long
to be feasible for a venture capital fund whose term is typically limited to ten years. 90 Thus, we
observe a combination of venture capital and joint venture financing that reflects the nature of
the technology being financed and the organizational structure through which the product is
carried out.

Conclusion
The effort here has been to describe the combination of forces---technology,
organizational structure, and financial contracting---that refracted through the prism of
transaction and information costs combine to influence the allocation of innovation either to an
established company to be financed by retained earnings or the company’s credit; to an early
stage company, with financing provided through venture capital; or to a joint venture of early
stage and established companies. The goal is to develop a better understanding of how
innovative activities are distributed across the economy. We considered four patterns where
developing an innovation is at the interface of established and startup or early stage companies:
When an established company employee with an innovation will pursue the innovation through a
startup; when an established company may face the threat of a disruptive technology pursued by
a smaller company; when an established company outsources particular R&D projects to a
technology race among venture capital funded early stage companies; and when an innovation is
located between an early stage biotechnology company and a large pharma through a joint
venture or strategic alliance. In the past, scholarship has largely focused on the arrangements
90
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associated with a particular location of innovation. Here the focus has been on the determinants
of the allocation of innovation across locations, with the hope that positive understanding of that
allocation leads to normative implications for those charged with engineering the transactions
giving rise to innovation.
Figure Two depicts a preliminary characterization of our effort to endogenize the location
of innovation by labeling the axes on the Innovative Plane in Figure One. The axes now reflect
the central elements that animated the discussion of each of the innovations whose location
posed a choice between a small early stage company and a large mature company. The
Organizational Structure axis reflects the relationship between organizational size and incentive
intensity: smaller focused companies can sustain more intense incentives. The Technology axis
reflects the difference between incremental and disruptive innovation. Finally, the Financial
Contracting axis moves between internal financing and venture capital financing. As an
illustration, Figure Two shows a high technology start up at a plausible location on the
Innovation Plane---small firm, intense incentives, less incremental innovation, venture capital
financing. Even so simple a depiction highlights our central theme: understanding the interaction
among technology, organizational structure and financial contracting is central to understanding
the location of innovation.
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In concluding, it is important to note three limits to the effort. First, the range of
innovation patterns discussed is quite limited. I believe that the same framework---the
endogeneity of technology, organizational structure, and financial contracting on the allocation
of innovation---will have broader application than the interface between early stage companies
and established companies considered here. Nonetheless, that inquiry, as well as more detailed
examination of the locations of innovation we did consider, remain to be undertaken. For
example, I have limited my analysis here to settings that shared the common characteristic of the
choice between locating innovation in a mature or early stage company. I expect the same
analysis could be applied to the interface between university and commercial located innovation.
Second, at any given point in the locational space, there will be overlap. No response to a
particular cluster of attributes is exclusive; depending on the particular characteristics of an
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individual company and the nature of the particular technology, a range of organizational
techniques may work. For example, some companies will successfully manage intense
incentives without negative spillovers to its existing R&D efforts even though the central
tendency will push in the direction of letting some innovations go. 91 Thus, the goal is to
understand the forces that underpin the observed central tendency, which then can be employed
to understand the variance in practice.
Finally, the analysis has been largely static, even though the market for innovation is,
tautologically, dynamic. For example, the vertical disintegration of the supply chain, 92 by
allowing a startup to outsource capital intensive functions like manufacturing and assembly to
contract manufacturers and chip fabricators, dramatically reduces the amount of capital that must
be raised, and thereby provides another source of financing for innovation. Similarly, the
evolution of biotechnology may come to broaden the range of organizational structures in which
it can be effectively carried out, a conjecture the accuracy of which the Roche acquisition of
Genentech and other acquisitions of biotechnology companies by large pharmas will test.
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